What If...? part two

 

The question I asked and didn't answer in my previous post was: What if Begin refused to sign the peace treaty with Sadat?

First let me direct you to an excellent article by Daniel Greenfield.

Here is a quote from that article:

"European models of conflict settlement never mapped well onto a region where there is no enduring form of government. Middle Eastern states are tribal arrangements ruled over by a combination of force and local consensus. A signed treaty with them was not an enduring agreement inherited by a republic, but an agreement with a family or an oligarchy. The overthrow of Mubarak and the subsequent rejection of Camp David by his successors is a reminder that even the most famous regional peace accord could not outlast Sadat and his chosen replacement."

So what if there weren't a peace agreement?

Sadat decided to propose an agreement after having "saved face" by attacking Israel in 1973. Not that the attack was such a resounding success. In fact it was a resounding failure. Israel paid a high price in casualties and undermined self-assurance. On the other hand, the 1973 war ended with Israel controlling not only the Sinai peninsula but also the mountain ranges on the Egyptian side of the Suez canal and the desert up to a 100 kilometers from Cairo. The Egyptian army was thoroughly defeated, lost its best new Soviet equipment and was incapable of any operations whatsoever. Egyptian propaganda persuaded the populace that the war was a great success and Egypt was victorious.

In the armistice negotiations that followed Israel agreed to return to its prewar border on the Suez canal. This agreement was partially due to heavy American pressure and partially due to Israel's reluctance to govern hundreds of thousands of Egyptians and have a land border with Egypt. The Suez was convenient: it prevented easy access by smugglers and infiltrators and posed a natural barrier to invasion, an advantage squandered by the Israeli commanders and politicians in 1973.

It took Sadat 6 years to decide that offering peace to Israel would achieve what he failed to achieve by war. Sadat's next move was courageous and smart: he offered to come to Israel for negotiations and to speak to the Israeli Knesset (parliament). One important reason Sadat made this decision was the fact that the Labor party that had ruled Israel since its independence was defeated in the 1975 elections following the war. A war that was perceived as a disaster by the Israeli public.

Menachem Begin's right wing Likud was in power and Sadat judged, correctly, that the right wing "patriotic" party would be in a position to give him what the leftist government that almost lost the war would not be able to. He was correct. But what if Begin had decided that Sadat's price was too high, instead following the logic laid out by Greenfield in the beginning of this post?

Israeli public opinion was seriously divided at the time of the peace negotiations. It is likely that if Begin refused to sign the agreement he could still have retained his ruling coalition and continued as Prime Minister until the next election. In fact the peace agreement came close to toppling the government.

Since Egypt and Syria were at the time in no condition to start another war the situation on the ground would have continued as before for some time. At the time Sadat came to Israel, Egypt and Syria were doing their best to re-arm and prepare for the next war. Syria was receiving large quantities of arms from the Soviets and Egypt was trying to become a client of the U.S. In the opinion of the Egyptian leadership part of the reason they kept losing wars against Israel was the bad equipment and inadequate training they got from the Soviets. Sadat knew that signing a peace agreement with Israel would allow him to become a client of the U.S. and President Carter obliged.

With no such agreement, becoming a recipient of U.S. arms and training would have been much harder. It is conceivable that Egypt would have become a client of the U.S. anyway - such was the cold war. On the other hand, absent an agreement with Israel the U.S. would probably be less generous. But let's assume that this part of history didn't change and Egypt received all the American arms it did anyway.

Israel didn't benefit at all from the agreement with Egypt. Like Sadat said after the agreement was signed: "Poor Menachem, I got all of Sinai and he got a piece of paper." This was exactly the case. Worse: the destruction and evacuation of Yamit, a Jewish city in the Sinai on the border with Gaza, became a precedent and was used to demand the removal of Israeli towns elsewhere. Before this it was assumed by Israel's enemies that towns and villages Israel build were there to stay. No anymore. The next steps were demands to remove Jewish towns and villages in Judea and Samaria and the destruction of Jewish towns in the north of the Gaza strip.

The peace with Egypt was a "cold peace" that didn't go beyond diplomatic relations. No trade and no cooperation developed because of Egyptian refusal. On the other hand, Gaza now had Egypt in close proximity with only a narrow piece of ground controlled by Israel separating them. This led to weapons smuggling from Egypt - Egypt refused any substantial action against the smugglers - and later opened the door to demands that Israel vacate the border all together - which it did.

The situation now is much worse that it was before the 1973 war and the 1979 peace accords. Due to the proximity to Egypt, Gaza became a heaven for terrorists. The Sinai is controlled by Islamists, Al-Qaeda and Bedouin tribes aligned with them. This puts all of southern Israel in danger of attacks from the Sinai (as was demonstrated recently).

Absent the 1979 peace agreement it is reasonable to expect that Israel would still control all of Sinai and the Sinai would continue as it was: a peaceful area with Bedouin tribes making a good living off tourism. Gaza would be peaceful as well and in the absence of a Palestinian Authority it would also not have Hamas or other organized terrorists. Since there were discussions even before the 1973 war of opening the Suez for traffic it is likely that such an arrangement could have been made to the mutual benefit of both countries.

Israel could also continue to benefit from the modest amounts of oil it was pumping from fields in the southern Sinai and, as we now know, it would have the additional benefit of stable and plentiful natural gas supplies.

On the other hand Egypt would most likely be receiving much less in American assistance. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and end of the cold war, there would be no reason for the U.S. to support Egypt as heavily as it did until 1989.

Israel would be much less vulnerable after the changes that took place in Egypt with the overthrow of Mubarak. It would still have strategic depth and would not depend on the next Egyptian tyrant for its security.

The one possible benefit of the agreement with Egypt was the agreement with Jordan. This is also of dubious value. Israel and Jordan cooperated before the agreement. Israel saved the Jordanian monarchy several times from the threats of Syria and both countries cooperated in the development of the Dead Sea industries. There were no changes for the better in the relationship after the signing of a peace agreement.